Religious Accommodation in the Workplace: What Employers and Lawyers Need to Know

Robert H. Bernstein

 Introduction

This article provides an overview of federal religious discrimination laws and focuses on employers’ obligation to accommodate faith-based dress and grooming standards and requests for time off to observe religious holidays and the Sabbath.

Overview

Workplace religious discrimination claims are on the rise. Indeed, from 2000 to 2011, in the wake of 9/11, greater religious diversity nationwide,¹  a rapidly globalizing world following the “tech-boom,” and a growing culture of hypervigilant “political correctness,” religion-based Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) claims nearly doubled, increasing to about five percent of all EEOC claims filed.²   During this same period, payouts for religion-based claims rose over 150 percent,³ and these statistics reflect only federal administrative charges; not lawsuits or state law claims.  Moreover, these statistics do not include claims for retaliation based on complaints or charges of religious discrimination or participation in an employment discrimination proceeding.⁴

As this article will address, within the universe of religious discrimination claims is a growing subset challenging employers’ obligation to accommodate employee religious practices and beliefs—including faith-based dress and grooming standards and requests for time off to observe religious holidays and the Sabbath.

As but one of many recent examples of this growing subset, in 2011, a federal judge in Oklahoma found that apparel company Abercrombie & Fitch violated Title VII when it refused to hire a Muslim teenager who wore a hijab, or headscarf, because her religious garb conflicted with the company’s “Look Policy.”  On summary judgment for the plaintiff, the court concluded that even though Abercrombie had a written and nationally-enforced “Look Policy”5 that did not allow head coverings, it failed to establish that accommodating the teen would cause the company to suffer undue hardship – a requirement once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case.⁶   Notably, the Court found that Abercrombie failed to meet its burden (to show it would suffer an undue hardship) because it could not produce data showing the teen’s religious apparel would adversely affect its bottom line. Id.

Other recent cases include: a 2010 North Carolina claim by a Jehovah’s Witness alleging Belk Department Stores refused to accommodate her religious beliefs by requiring her to wear a Santa hat and apron during the Christmas holiday in contravention of her religious beliefs—the case settled for $55,000 7 ; a 2010 Pennsylvania lawsuit by a Rastafarian terminated by UPS after he refused to shave or cut his hair in accordance with company grooming policies⁸; and a 2007 Arizona case in which a federal jury awarded $288,000 in damages to a Muslim women fired four months after 9/11 for wearing a headscarf during Ramadan.⁹  These cases will be discussed in greater detail later in this article.

Due to the proliferation of religious discrimination claims, the law is evolving rapidly and often in challenging ways for employers. While employers maintain significant discretion when it comes to regulating their workplaces—from scheduling to physical appearance—in the wake of this spike in religion-based claims, employers would be prudent to revisit their policies for addressing conflictive employee religious practices, and their methods and procedures for determining whether an accommodation is needed. In other words, employers must carefully draft and enforce policies that allow them to meet their increasing legal obligations without undermining their control over the workplace or negatively affecting their bottom lines. If they do not, the results may well be costly—whether due to increased liability or litigation, increased overhead, a loss of control over the workplace, or diminished employee morale.

In analyzing this growing area of law, this article discusses the protections afforded by and obligations imposed under Title VII in the workplace, including: i) threshold issues, such as what claimed religious beliefs are actually protected under federal law; ii) the elements necessary to establish religious discrimination claims; and iii) an employer’s duty to accommodate religious beliefs absent a showing of undue hardship. Moreover, this article discusses some of the most commonly litigated religious accommodation issues over the past few years, including dress, grooming, and religious observance conflicts. Finally, this article offers practical guidance for implementing policies and procedures for recognizing—and avoiding—the most common religious discrimination claims.

Religious Discrimination: Threshold Issues

Who Is Required to Comply with Title VII?

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 applies to “employers” who employ fifteen or more employees—each working day—for twenty or more calendar weeks in either the current year or the year preceding the one to be covered.¹⁰  Likewise, an “employer” is any “person,” which includes individuals, corporations, labor unions, partnerships, trusts, and governments affecting commerce.¹¹ 

What Is “Religion” and What “Beliefs” or “Practices” Are Protected?

Title VII prohibits covered employers from discriminating against any individual based on his or her “bona fide religious belief.”¹²  A “bona fide religious belief” is one based on a “sincerely held” “religion.” Pursuant to Title VII, “religion” includes “all aspects of religious observance and practice as well as belief.”¹³  Courts and the EEOC interpret “religion” to include traditional, well-known, and widely practiced religions as well as newly-formed, seemingly illogical, and unusual practices—with little or no weight given to the number or ardor of a particular “religion’s” followers.¹⁴  As the Supreme Court in Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Division observed:  “[I]t is not within the judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or [another practitioner] … more correctly perceived the commands of their common faith.  Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation.”  Thus, a practice followed by a single individual with no basis in traditional concepts of religion or the divine, such as the Church of Body Modification, may still qualify as a “religion” for purposes of Title VII, even if the follower does not prevail in her claim.¹⁵  In fact, atheists are protected under Title VII as courts have held they should have the freedom to believe or not believe.¹⁶

To be protected as a “bona fide religious belief,” the belief must not only be based on a “religion,” it must be “sincerely held.”¹⁷  An employee’s assertion that a belief is “sincerely held” is generally not disputed given the expansive interpretation afforded under Title VII. In fact, while purely secular beliefs, for instance, are not “bona fide,” courts may not extensively inquire into the validity or deep-rooted nature of one’s claimed beliefs. In other words, an employee’s assertion that he engages in a religious practice that conflicts with his job requirements and requires accommodation must be given great weight. Courts look to the sincerity of an employee’s belief, and do not analyze the merits of that belief.

Nevertheless, there is a limit—however slight—as to what “religious” activity is protected. For instance, a claim that consumption of cat food is a “personal religious creed” that provides deep spiritual comfort is considered a personal preference that is not protected by Title VII.¹⁸   Even so, such cases most often constitute outliers as opposed to a general rule, and, in effect, most every alleged “bona fide religious belief” is afforded protection under Title VII.¹⁹

In sum, though an alleged belief, religion or religious practice may seem absurd, shocking to the conscience, far-fetched or the byproduct of an over-active imagination, it should not be lightly discounted under Title VII. Employers seldom win discrimination claims on this ground and may well expose  themselves to needless litigation when they refuse even to consider or otherwise analyze the merits of an employee’s request. Employers would therefore be prudent to consider an employee’s request for accommodation, or apparent need for one, and engage in an interactive process with the employee to provide a reasonable accommodation.

Establishing a Prima Facie Case

An employee establishes a prima facie case of religious discrimination where: 1) he engages in a “bona fide” religious practice or observance that conflicts with his work responsibilities, 2) his employer is on notice of such practice and conflict; and 3) he is disciplined for practicing his conflicting beliefs. If an employee establishes the foregoing, the burden then shifts to the employer to show it offered a reasonable accommodation or that an accommodation would cause undue hardship.²⁰   In addition to the foregoing, employers should consider state law, which may impose additional burdens.

As discussed in Section II above, religious discrimination cases rarely hinge on whether a religious belief is “bona fide” as it is largely a subjective standard. Similarly, establishing “notice” and “discipline” are relatively low hurdles for employees. Regarding notice, a number of cases hold that notice is given where “an employer has enough information to make it aware a conflict exists between the individual’s religious practice or belief and a requirement for applying for or performing the job.”²¹  

In the 2011 Abercrombie case, the Northern District of Oklahoma found defendant Abercrombie was on sufficient “notice” of a Muslim teen’s religious belief that she must wear a hijab in public at all times because she wore the hijab to her job interview.²²  However, in reference to requests for time off to observe the Sabbath and religious holidays, employees generally bear the affirmative obligation of not only requesting time off, but also explicitly explaining that their request is for religious observance.²³

In the same vein, establishing an employee was “disciplined” merely involves a showing that the employee underwent a material change in a term, condition, or privilege of his employment.²⁴  As this article will now address, most religious discrimination litigation involves disputes over whether an accommodation is “reasonable” and whether it creates an “undue hardship.”

Reasonably Accommodate Without Undue Hardship

Once an employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to “reasonably accommodate” the religious conflict or establish that doing so creates an “undue hardship.”²⁵  Regrettably, Congress has yet to define either “reasonably accommodate” or “undue hardship.” The deluge of resultant case law demonstrates that the definitions are amorphous and vary drastically based on the particular facts of a case. While there are few bright line rules or universal principles, the considerable litigation interpreting these terms at least provides boundaries for avoiding the most commonly encountered discrimination claims. Therefore, this section provides a framework for analyzing the most common litigation on this front.²⁶ 

Accommodation of Sabbath Days and Religious Holidays

Employees often seek accommodation for religious holidays, Sabbath observance, prayer breaks, and other similar religious observances that cut into the time they are able to work.²⁷  In fact, the United States Supreme Court has addressed this very issue on two separate occasions. First, in the seminal 1977 case of Trans World Airlines v. Hardison,²⁸  the Supreme Court “defined the extent of an employer’s duty to accommodate [such occurrences] by interpreting the meaning of ‘undue hardship.’” In that case, an employee refused to work on Saturdays for religious reasons.²⁹  To accommodate the individual, the employer “would have had to transfer employees from other departments and suffer lost efficiency due to understaffing, violate the seniority provision of a collective bargaining agreement (and at the same time force undesirable shifts on the individual’s coworkers), or pay overtime wages to substitute workers on Saturdays.”³⁰  The Court determined that the expense of accommodating the employee was more than de minimis and hence constituted an undue hardship.³¹  Thus, it held that the employer acted lawfully in refusing the employee’s accommodation request and, in turn, in terminating him for excessive unexcused absences after he missed several Saturday shifts.³²

The Supreme Court provided further insight in the 1986 case of Ansonia Board of Education v. Philbrook,³³ There, a public school teacher alleged the school board’s three-day limit on paid leave for religious observance conflicted with his sincerely held religious beliefs, which required him to miss more than three days of work per year.³⁴   Under his contract with the school, the teacher was also entitled to three personal days per year.³⁵  However, pursuant to his contract, he could not use those days for any other leave covered by the contract, including religious observance.³⁶  The teacher sought either to use his personal days for religious observance, or to be given the right to personally pay a substitute and still receive full pay for any days he missed.³⁷  The school board refused both of the teacher’s proposed accommodations, requiring he use unpaid leave if he needed additional days off for religious observance.³⁸

The Supreme Court found the school board acted lawfully39  holding that even where an employer is required to provide an accommodation, it is under no duty to “accept, or prove the unreasonableness of, an employee’s suggested accommodation.”⁴⁰  Since this case, “the Supreme Court has been silent on the scope of the duty to accommodate religious practices under Title VII.”⁴¹   Even so, a number of decisions since Philbrook have further analyzed the bounds of an employer’s duty to accommodate, and when an accommodation crosses the threshold between a de minimis cost and an “undue hardship.” Almost every case “involving accommodation alternatives that work to the financial detriment of the employer (whether that detriment was direct or indirect)” has religiously—pun intended—followed the Supreme Court’s decision in Hardison.⁴²   In effect, “it has evolved into a per se approach [where] virtually all cost alternatives have been declared unduly harsh simply because a loss is involved.”⁴³

This determination is particularly notable in several recent cases.  First, in the recent case of Rumfola v. Total Petrochemical USA, Inc., 2012 WL 860405 (M.D. La. Mar. 13, 2012), a federal district court in Louisiana denied summary judgment for the employer – a chemical manufacturer – on the question of religious accommodation. In that case, the employee was a member of the Living Church of God, which prohibits work on their Sabbath, from sundown Friday until sundown Saturday. Id. at *1.  In April 2010, the employer implemented a short term “all hands on deck” policy to carry out a major overhaul, which required everyone to work over the weekend. Plaintiff asked to be switched to Friday morning, but the employer denied her request, and she was ultimately terminated for failing to show up at work on Saturday morning. Id. In denying employer’s motion for summary judgment, the court distinguished Trans World Airlines and determined that the employer could not demonstrate, as a matter of law, that reasonable accommodation was given, or that undue hardship would result. Id. at *6.

Similarly, in the unpublished 2011 case of Fouche v. New Jersey Transit Corp.,⁴⁴  the United States District Court in New Jersey granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant employer that terminated a Christian employee for refusing to work on the Sabbath.  The court held that even if the employee established a prima facie case, the defendant employer demonstrated it made a good-faith effort to reasonably accommodate the plaintiff when it offered to reclassify him from a full- to a part-time employee.⁴⁵   This case may be unique in that plaintiff belonged to a union that had a collective bargaining agreement with his employer.  In relevant part, it “contained a provision whereby bus drivers chose their work schedules based on seniority.”  The court, in line with Hardison and Philbrook, held that any additional accommodation would interfere with the defendant’s longstanding seniority system for selecting hours, and otherwise interfere with employee morale, thus crossing the de minimis threshold and constituting an “undue hardship.”⁴⁶

Whether an accommodation is required, is reasonable, or causes an undue hardship, is heavily fact-specific. While lower courts agree that employees have a duty to cooperate in securing accommodation for their religious needs, reschedule religious events, and lose or give up certain benefits, the parameters are still ill-defined.⁴⁷  Employers have been found to reasonably accommodate workers where they permit paid time off, but require employees to exhaust vacation or leave days.⁴⁸  Similarly, where providing paid leave causes undue hardship, employers have been found to reasonably accommodate workers where they permitted unpaid leave.⁴⁹  Numerous other arrangements—Including requiring employees to make up lost time, swap shifts, or accept demotion from salaried to hourly status—have been found “reasonable accommodations” under Title VII.⁵⁰  In contrast, it has been held that an “employer would not incur undue hardship in accommodating a Sabbatarian where the employer had a pool of roving absentee replacement workers at its disposal to fill in for absent employees,” and “that a defendant company had a duty to accommodate an employee who believed it was sinful to pay union dues, since the loss of one employee’s dues would not create an undue hardship.”⁵¹

In short, in the context of determining whether accommodating a request for time off for religious observance will cause undue hardship, courts typically look to whether such an accommodation will cause an economic burden, negatively impact other employees, violate another law, or undermine a collective bargaining agreement or seniority system.⁵²  As is clear from controlling Supreme Court precedent to the most recent cases analyzing the scope of Title VII in relation to religious observance, this burden for employers is relatively low. However, case law is still rife with controversies regarding whether the accommodation given in the first instance is “reasonable.” This is a highly fact-specific inquiry, and is best analyzed on a case-by- case basis.

Accommodation of Faith-Based Dress and Grooming Standards

Courts apply a similar analysis when evaluating claims pertaining to religious observance, dress, and grooming standards. Like other Title VII claims, after a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to show it provided a reasonable accommodation, or that doing so would cause an undue hardship. These terms are not mutually exclusive, and one cannot be analyzed without considering the other. As noted in the preceding section and pursuant to well-settled Supreme Court case law, an employer’s duty to accommodate is cut off at the moment it imposes an undue hardship on the employer.⁵³  Establishing an undue hardship, or an economic or non-economic cost to the employer that is more than de minimis, is only a slight burden.⁵⁴  Whether accommodating dress or grooming standards is “reasonable” or would cause an “undue hardship” often hinges on whether the accommodation creates a safety, security, or health risk. If an accommodation jeopardizes the safety, security or health of the individual employee, his co-workers or the public at large, it most often constitutes an undue hardship. In contrast, an accommodation that merely jeopardizes corporate image or arguably tarnishes the aesthetics of an operation is less likely so.

Safety, Security, or Health Risks

“[A] religious accommodation that creates a genuine safety or security risk can undoubtedly constitute an undue hardship.”⁵⁵  Traditionally, many cases under this umbrella arise in private manufacturing or public detention settings where religious apparel requirements often conflict with workplace safety protocols.

For Instance, in the 2010 case of Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. GEO Group, Inc.,⁵⁶   the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that an employer did not violate Title VII where it prohibited female prison workers from wearing kihmars.  While plaintiffs were able to establish a prima facie case, the private employer established that an accommodation would impose an undue hardship as:  “(1) kihmars, like hats, could be used to smuggle contraband into and around [the prison], (2) that kihmars can be used to conceal the identity of the wearer, which creates problems of misidentification, and (3) that kihmars could be used against a prison employee in an attack.”⁵⁷   While the headgear had never been used for such nefarious purposes in the past, the court reasoned that safety is a top priority for the protection of guards, inmates, and visitors, such that there should be no requirement of a showing of past transgressions.⁵⁸

Other recent cases include an early 2012 case in the Northern District of Mississippi, Finnie v. Lee County,—which relied on Webb and Geo Group Inc.  There, the Court determined that Title VII did not require a sheriff’s department to accommodate a Pentecostal employee’s desire to wear a skirt, instead of pants.⁵⁹  Considering much of the recent jurisprudence on this matter, the court reasoned: “[A]n employer cannot give preference to an employee because of his or her religion any more than it can discriminate against that employee for the same reason. It is axiomatic that preferential treatment involves discriminating against one in favor of another which, in the context of religion, is exactly the conduct proscribed by Title VII.”⁶⁰  Conversely, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to extend this reasoning outside of the safety context, arguing that an elementary school’s grooming standard, which required students to wear their hair in buns, created an undue burden on a Native American student.⁶¹  Whether courts will follow the reasoning in Finnie, and whether other courts will begin creating more concrete rules of law on this matter remains to be seen.

Corporate Image: Hijabs, Santa Hats, and Religious Apparel

While many religious discrimination cases involving corporate dress codes arise in the manufacturing or public detention settings, a growing number involve clashes between religious apparel requirements and corporate image. In these cases, employers face the increasing burden of establishing undue hardship. For instance, in the aforementioned case of EEOC v. Abercrombie, defendant Abercrombie was sued after it refused to hire a Muslim teen who wore a hijab in contravention of its well-established “Look Policy.”⁶²  In that case, the plaintiff wore a hijab to her job interview at an Abercrombie Kids store in Oklahoma.  A District Manager determined that though the teen was otherwise a good fit for Abercrombie, her headscarf conflicted with the Company “Look Policy” such that she should not be hired.64  When the complainant learned of Abercrombie’s reasons for denying her employment, she filed a charge with the EEOC.⁶⁵

In ruling for the EEOC on summary judgment, the court found Abercrombie violated Title VII in refusing to hire or accommodate the teen without a showing of undue hardship.⁶⁶  In relevant part, the court did not believe Abercrombie presented evidence establishing its sales would suffer if a deviation from its “Look Policy” were allowed.  Further, it concluded that any such evidence would be undermined by the fact that Abercrombie, on eight or nine prior occasions, allowed females in other stores to wear religious headscarves and previously allowed deviations from the “Look Policy” for other independent reasons. Id. It is uncertain what the outcome would have been had Abercrombie been able to demonstrate it consistently enforced its “Look Policy.”

Accordingly, while the need to hire additional workers, pay overtime, undermine an established seniority system, infringe on co-workers’ duties or rights, or threaten security to cover a religious employee’s accommodation are generally regarded as imposing an undue hardship, minor “administrative” costs or harm to company aesthetic are seldom considered more than de minimis costs.⁶⁷  Further, as demonstrated by the Abercrombie case, employers should bear in mind that courts will look to how they responded to similar requests in the past. If analogous accommodations were previously permitted, an employer bears a greater burden in establishing the accommodation at issue is unfeasible.

Conclusion

In sum, religious discrimination claims are on the rise and likely to increase in number as our world grows more diverse and more technologically connected. A number of recent cases reflect this growing trend and a high percentage of claims pertaining to employers’ obligation to accommodate faith-based dress and grooming standards and requests for time off for observance of religious holidays and the Sabbath.

Robert H. Bernstein heads Constangy Brooks & Smith LLP’s Princeton, New Jersey office. For nearly 30 years, Mr. Bernstein has developed an extensive labor and employment practice, exclusively representing multinational and domestic corporations on both a regional and national basis, with an emphasis in employment litigation and counseling. He handles class and collective actions covering the full panoply of federal and state anti-discrimination and wage and hour laws.  Robert H. Bernstein would like to thank Falon M. Wrigley, an Associate at Constangy Brooks & Smith LLP, for her hard work and invaluable contribution to the article.

Footnotes:

1. See generally, Roger Bennett, et al., OMG! How Generation Y is Redefining Faith in the iPod Era, Reboot (2005), (discussing a recent Brookings Institute study showing 23 percent of working age adults ascribe to no religion, 26 percent are Protestant, 20 percent are Catholic, 2 percent are Jewish, 2 percent are Muslim, 2 percent are Mormon, 14 percent are “other” Christian and 7 percent are other, not Christian).
2. See EEOC Charge Statistics FY 1997 through FY 2011.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1272, 1287 (N.D. Okla. 2011).
6. Id.
7. EEOC v. Belk, Inc., No. 5:10-cv-00300 (E.D.N.C. July 29, 2010).
8. EEOC v. UPS Ground Freight, No. 1:08-cv-01806 (M.D. Pa. Order of Resolution filed Feb. 11, 2010); see also Press Release, U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, UPS Freight to Pay $46,000 to Settle EEOC Religious Discrimination Lawsuit, (Feb 17, 2010)
9. EEOC v. Alamo Rent-A-Car LLC, 432 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1017 (D. Ariz. 2006).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(2010).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j); 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(1); see also United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 160, 166 (1970) (where the United States Supreme Court held that a religious belief is protected if it “is sincere and meaningfully occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption.”).
14. 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981)
15. Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 390 F.3d 126, 132 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding that for the purposes of Title VII analysis, the plaintiff had a “sincerely held” religious belief, but ultimately ruled for the employer, holding “Cloutier's insistence on a wholesale exemption from the no-facial-jewelry policy precludes Costco from using its managerial discretion to search for a reasonable accommodation.”);  but see Brown v. F.L. Roberts & Co., Inc., 896 N.E.2d 1279, 1286 (Mass. 2008) (refusing to extend Cloutier because Massachusetts’s state anti-discrimination statute had different requirements, and because the employer failed to engage in a dialogue regarding reasoanble accommodation).
16. Young v. Southwestern Sav. and Loan Ass’n, 509 F.2d 140, 142-43 (5th Cir. 1975).
17. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 62.
18. Brown v. Pena, 441 F. Supp. 1382, 1384 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
19. Kerri S. Reisdorff, Missouri Employment Discrimination, Religious Discrimination, Missouri Bar Association CLE (2008) (discussing Brown, 441 F. Supp. at 1384).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a); see also Hardison, infra note 61.
21. Aercrombie, supra note 4 at 1285.
22. Id. at 1286.
23. See, e.g., Moaz v. Conoco Phillips, 2011 WL 3331397 (D.Colo. 2011) (granting summary judgment for the defendant upon finding that it did not unlawfully terminate the plaintiff after he requested two days off work for a religious holiday where his employer was unaware of the holiday and his written request made no reference to it); Thomas v. Croft, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48442 (SD OH, May 4, 2011) (denying A Seventh Day Adventist plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment where he was disciplined after failing to perform work after sunset on Fridays in accord with his beliefs but did not put his superior on notice of those beliefs or his need for an accommodation).
24. Employment Coordinator, 5 Emp. Coord. Employment Practices § 4:14 (2011).
25. See Hardison, infra note 61; see also Smith v. Pyro Mining Co., 827 F.2d 1081, 1085 (6th Cir. 1987) (once an employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to prove it cannot reasonably accommodate the employee without undue hardship); Turpen v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 736 F.2d 1022, 1026 (5th Cir. 1984) (same).
26. Andrew M. Campbell, What Constitutes Employer’s Reasonable Accommodation of Employee’s Religious Preferences Under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964, 34 A.L.R. Fed. 1 (1996).
27. 29 C.F.R. § 1605, App. A.
28. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
29. Holly M. Bastian, Religious Garb Statutes and Title VII: An Uneasy Coexistence, 80 GEO. L.J. 211, 222 (1991) (discussing the practical effect of the Court’s decision in Hardison).
30. Id. at 221 (analyzing TWA, 432 U.S. at 84-85).
31. TWA, 432 U.S. at 84.
32. Id.
33. 479 U.S. 60 (1986).
34. Id. at 62-63.
35. Id. at 64.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 65.
39. Id. at 66.
40. See Sonny Franklin Miller, Religious Accommodation Under Title VII: The Burdenless Burden, 22 J. CORP. L. 789 (1996-1997) (citing Hardison, 432 U.S. at 63).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 795.
43. Id.
44. 2011 WL 2792450 (D.N.J. 2011)
45. Id. at *1.
46. Id. at *5.
47. Debbie Kaminer, Title VII’s Failure to Provide Meaningful and Consistent Protection of Religious Employees, 21 BERKLY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 575 (2000) (citing Hudson v. W. Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1988) (a collective bargaining agreement “allowed employees to trade shifts with coworkers, and allowed employee lateral transfers in order to gain seniority privileges.”).
48. Getz v. Com. Of Pennsylvania Dep’t of Public Welfare, 802 F.2d 72, 74 (3d Cir. 1986).
49. Pinsker v. Joint Dist. No. 28J of Adams and Arapahoe Counties, 735 F.2d 388, 391 (10th Cir. 1984).
50. Keeling, 2011 WL 2633530 at *7; Fields v. Rainbow Rehab. Ctr. Inc., 2011 WL 2447974 (E.D. Mich. June 14, 2011)(finding an employee was reasonably accommodated where the defendant offered to let him trade shifts with other workers and to schedule one-on-one meetings when he missed those held on days he requested off; the employer was not obligated to ensure that the employee was able to swap every shift).
51. Bastian, Religious Garb, supra note 31 (citing Protos v. Volkswagon, 797 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1986) and International Association of Machinists v. Boeing Co., 833 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1987)).
52. See Bastian, supra note 31.
53. Hardison, 432 U.S. at 63
54. Id. at 84; see also Webb v. City of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256, 259-60 (3d Cir. 2009).
55. EEOC v. GEO Group, Inc., 616 F.3d 265, 273 (3d Cir. 2010).
56. 616 F.3d 265 (3rd Cir. 2010).
57. Id. at 274.
58. Id. at 273.
59. Finnie v. Lee County, Miss., 2012 WL 124587, *1 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 17, 2012)
60. Id. at *22.
61. A.A. ex rel. Betenbaugh v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 611 F.3d 248, 271 (5th Cir. 2010) (“What we have in the present case is an elementary school, which, even in its most authoritarian form, is neither a military operation nor an incarceration facility.”).
62. 798 F. Supp. 2d at 1275.
63. Id. at 1276.
64. Id. at 1278.
65. Id. at 1275.
66. Id. at 1287.
67. Commission Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(e)(1